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Abstract
Mortgages can be broadly classified into adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and fixed-rate
mortgages (FRMs). We document a surprising amount of time variation in the fraction
of newly-originated mortgages that are of either type in the US and UK. A simple utility
framework points to the importance of term structure variables in explaining this variation.
In particular, the inflation risk premium, real interest rate risk premium and both the real
rate and expected inflation volatility arise as potential determinants. We use a flexible
VAR-model to measure these four term structure variables and show that they account for
the bulk of variation in the ARM share. Risk premia alone explain sixty percent of the
time variation in mortgage choice. Other term structure variables, such as the yield spread,
seem only weakly related to the ARM share. We uncover interesting differences between
the US and the UK. In the US, the inflation risk premium is most strongly related to the
ARM share, while in the UK it is the real rate risk premium. In the US, FRMs contain a
prepayment option. We analyze the impact of the prepayment option on optimal mortgage
choice. The prepayment option hardly weakens the effects of risk premia on mortgage
choice.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important decisions any household has to make during its lifetime is whether to
own a house and, if so, how to finance it. The home ownership rate in the US stands at 68% and US
residential mortgage debt exceeds $9 trillion. There are two broad categories of housing finance:
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs). There is a surprisingly large
variation in the composition of newly-originated mortgages. Figure 1 plots the share of newly-
originated mortgages that is of the ARM-type in the US economy between January 1985 and
June 2006. This ARM share varies between 10% and 70%. In this paper we seek to explain this
variation.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We claim that a large fraction of the variation in the ARM share can be attributed to time-
variation in bond risk premia. Consider a simple homoscedastic economy without inflation in
which households have mean-variance preferences over consumption, and consume what is left
from income after mortgage payments are made. In such an economy, the choice between an ARM
and FRM boils down to comparing expected mortgage payments and their (constant) variability.
Ignoring the prepayment option, fixed-rate mortgages are long-term loans whose payments are tied
to the long-term nominal interest rate. The adjustable-rate mortgage payments are tied to the
short-term nominal interest rate instead. The difference in expected payments on the FRM and
ARM equals the nominal bond risk premium. The payments on the FRM are known at origination,
while the ARM payments depend on future short rates. The mortgage choice then reduces to a
trade-off between bond risk premia and short rate volatility. For the more realistic economy in
which inflation erodes nominal mortgage payments, we decompose the nominal bond risk premium
into the real rate premium and expected inflation premium. The difference in expected payments
between the FRM and the ARM (approximately) equals the sum of the real premium and the
expected inflation premium. In this world with constant variances, an increase in bond risk premia
also makes the FRM less desirable, and is predicted to increase the share of ARM originations. In
sum, time-variation in bond risk premia leads to time-variation in the preferred mortgage type.
Figure 2 plots the ARM share (solid line, measured against the left axis) alongside the five-year
expected inflation risk premium (dashed line, measured against the right axis). We obtain the
inflation risk premium as the difference between the five-year nominal bond yield and the sum of
the five-year real bond yield and the five-year expected inflation. The nominal yield data are from
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and real bond yield data from McCulloch. Real data are
available as of January 1997 when the US Treasury introduced treasury inflation-protected securi-
ties (TIPS). We use the median long-term inflation forecast of the survey of professional forecasters
(SPF) to measure expected inflation. Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2006) argue that such survey data
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provides the best inflation forecasts among a wide array of methods. The contemporaneous corre-
lation between the two series is 80%. This suggests that a large fraction of variation in the ARM
share can be understood by time variation in inflation risk premia. To illustrate, in each of the
1998.10-2000.4 and 2003.5-2005.3 periods, the inflation risk premium increased by more than 150
basis points. This made fixed-rate mortgages less desirable, and US households shifted into ARMs.
In both episodes, the ARM share tripled.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In Section 2, we formalize the utility-based mortgage choice argument. We distinguish between
an investor with money illusion who maximizes utility over nominal consumption, and a rational
investor who maximizes utility of real consumption streams instead.1 By solving for the deter-
minants of mortgage choice in both models, we illustrate how money illusion potentially affects
the financing decision. The latter analysis points to four yield curve determinants of mortgage
choice: the expected inflation risk premium, the real rate risk premium, the variability of expected
inflation, and the variability of the real rate. We develop a vector auto-regression (VAR) model
in Section 3 in order to estimate these four components on US data. The VAR structure read-
ily provides a way to measure expected inflation and expected real rates and is an alternative to
the survey data. We then conduct a regression analysis, and find that the four term-structure
determinants typically enter with the right sign. The expected inflation risk premium emerges as
the dominant explanatory variable for mortgage choice in the US. It alone explains about 60% of
the variation in the ARM share. Adding the other term structure variables does not affect this
conclusion.
We compare these results with predictors of the ARM share proposed in the literature. Camp-
bell and Cocco (2003) advocate the spread between the yields on a nominal long-term and short-
term bond, and Campbell (2006) and Vickery (2006) use the spread between a FRM rate and an
ARM rate, as a determinant of the ARM share. We find low explanatory power for these variables
over the common sample. Our model suggests why. The yield spread is a contaminated measure of
bond risk premia because it not only picks up the bond risk premia, but also deviations of expected
future nominal short rates from the current nominal short rate. These two components are nega-
tively correlated. For example, when expected inflation is high, the inflation risk premium is high
as well, but expected future short rates are below the current one because inflation is expected to
revert back to its long-term mean. Vickery (2006) also finds that household-specific characteristics
have little explanatory power for mortgage choice. This is an important finding because it suggests
that market-wide variables are the relevant variables to study. Theoretically, we show that bond
risk premia are the relevant variables and we confirm their importance in our empirical analysis.
1Brunnermeier and Julliard (2006) argue that money illusion is prevalent in the housing market and can explain
a large part of the recent run-up in house prices.
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We verify the robustness of our results to (i) alternative definitions of the ARM share, (ii) using
a different VAR model to construct long-term expectations and risk premia, (iii) real interest rate
data generated by the term structure model of Ang and Bekaert (2005) rather than using TIPS
data, (iv) the persistence in the variables included in the regressions. The analysis leads us to
conclude that bond risk premia are a robust determinant of aggregate mortgage choice.
In the US, FRMs typically have an embedded prepayment option which allows the mortgage
borrower to pay off the loan at will. To understand the impact of the prepayment option on the
preference for mortgage types, we value this prepayment option in our model with time-varying
interest rates, inflation, risk premia, and volatilities.2 We show that the prepayment option reduces
the exposures to the underlying risk factors. However, it continues to hold that higher bond risk
premia favor ARMs.
We extend our analysis to the UK. If bond risk premia are an important determinant of aggre-
gate mortgage choice, our results should carry over to another country with another interest rate
environment. FRM contracts in the UK have much shorter maturities than in the US. This implies
that inflation risk, which manifests itself predominantly at long horizons, may be less important
for choosing between ARMs and FRMs. In contrast to the US, FRMs do not have a prepayment
option. Finally, we have a longer time-series of real interest rate data available than for the US.
We find that the real rate and expected inflation premium positively predict the ARM share in
the UK, just as they did in the US. However, in sharp contrast to the US, we also find that it
is the real rate premium instead of the inflation risk premium that is the dominant predictor of
mortgage choice in the UK. The variation in the ARM share explained by these bond risk premia
equals 23% for the 1993-2006 sample with quarterly data and 62% for the 2002-2006 sample with
monthly data.
Our results suggest that households may have an ability to optimally time their mortgage
choice. This is certainly no easy task because it requires the ability to calculate inflation and real
risk premia. From a normative perspective, time variation in bond risk premia, documented by
Fama and French (1989), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Dai and Singleton (2002), Buraschi and
Jiltsov (2005), and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), certainly has value-added to investors timing
bond markets. Indeed, Brandt and Santa-Clara (2006), Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003),
Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005), and Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2006) argue that exploiting
time variation in bond risk premia is valuable to (long-term) investors.3 Our exercise suggests that
2There exists a large literature on prepayment models which either assume optimal prepayment (e.g., Dunn
and McConnell (1981) and Pliska (2006)) or empirical prepayment behavior (e.g., Schwartz and Torous (1989) and
Boudoukh, Whitelaw, Richardson, and Stanton (1997)). We consider a rational prepayment model and abstract
from refinancing costs. Longstaff (2005) and Stanton (1995) model refinancing costs explicitly.
3Campbell and Viceira (2001), Brennan and Xia (2002), and van Hemert (2006) derive the optimal portfolio
strategy for long-term investors in the presence of stochastic real interest rates and inflation, but these papers
3
mortgage choice is another financial decision setting in which households optimally incorporate
bond risk premia in their decision making. In addition, we show that bond risk premia are the
most important determinants of mortgage choice among a wide variety of yield variables and
that they explain most of the variation in mortgage choice. Some have expressed skepticism
towards financial sophistication of households (Campbell (2006)). One counter-argument is that
mortgage choice is undoubtedly one of the most important financial decisions a household has to
make. Many households therefore seek out advice from financial professionals, mostly mortgage
lenders. The paper concludes with a discussion which argues that the incentives of mortgage
lenders to recommend a particular type of mortgage may be aligned with households’ incentives.
This strengthens the plausibility of our results.
Finally, our paper also relates to the corporate finance literature on the timing of capital
structure decisions. The firm’s problem of maturity choice of debt is akin to the household’s choice
between an ARM and an FRM. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) show that firms are able
to time bond markets. The maturity of debt decreases in periods of high bond risk premia.4 Our
findings suggest that households also have the ability to incorporate information on bond risk
premia in their long-term financing decision.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a utility-based framework that identifies
the main determinants of mortgage choice. It also defines the term structure variables used in
the subsequent empirical analysis, and relates them to the yield spread. In Section 3 we develop
the VAR-model that is used to extract long-term expectations and bond risk premia, as well as
volatilities of the real rate and expected inflation. We then show how these term structure variables
relate to time-variation in mortgage choice in Section 4. Section 5 extends the analysis of Section 3
by modeling the prepayment option embedded in US FRM contracts. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to value the prepayment option in a model with time-varying risk premia and time-
varying volatilities. In Section 6, we repeat the analysis for the UK economy. Section 7 considers
the hedging problem that mortgage lenders face and argues that that lenders may have an incentive
to recommend ARMs exactly when bond risk premia are high. Section 8 concludes.
2 Determinants of Mortgage Choice
This section explores the choice between a fixed-rate (FRM) and an adjustable-rate mortgage
(ARM). The model is kept deliberately simple and serves to motivate the use of term structure
variables as determinants of mortgage choice in Section 4. We start in a world without inflation
assume risk premia to be constant.
4See also Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2006) and Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) for a recent discussion
of this result.
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(Section 2.1) and subsequently introduce inflation (Section 2.2).
2.1 Optimal Mortgage Choice: Nominal Mean-Variance Analysis
We consider a discrete-time setting for an investor with mean-variance preferences over a nominal
consumption stream {Ct}. The preference parameter γ summarizes the investor’s risk preferences.
The subjective time discount factor is 1. The investor receives an independently identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) stochastic income stream {Lt}.
At time 0, the investor buys a house with a value that is normalized to $1. We assume that the
house price has a constant nominal value. To finance the house, the investor chooses a mortgage
of the ARM or FRM type. The face value of the mortgage equals $1 as well; we assume a 100%
loan-to-value ratio. The investment horizon and the maturity of the mortgage contract equal T
periods. At times 1 trough T the investor pays interest on the mortgage, but no payments on the
principal are due.
Denote the stream of mortgage payments by {qt}. To keep the problem as simple as possible,
we postulate initially that the investor is liquidity constrained. In each period, she consumes what
is left over from income after making the mortgage payment. This seems a plausible assumption
because most households are young and not very wealthy at the time of mortgage origination. The
mortgage choice at time 0 then boils down to
max
h∈{ARM,FRM}
T∑
t=1
E0(C
h
t )− γVar0(C
h
t ), (1)
s.t. Cht = Lt − q
h
t , t = 1, · · · , T . (2)
In the last period, the value of the house and the mortgage balance cancel each other out and
do not affect consumption. Because labor income is i.i.d. and uncorrelated with the mortgage
payment, the mortgage choice problem simplifies to the following minimization
min
h∈{ARM,FRM}
T∑
t=1
E0(q
h
t ) + γVar0(q
h
t ). (3)
We denote the nominal price at time t of a nominal τ -period zero-coupon bond by Pt(τ). The
yield y$t (τ), and the one-period forward rate f
$
t (τ) are given by
y$t (τ) ≡ −
1
τ
log (Pt(τ)) , (4)
f $t (τ) ≡ − log
(
P (t, τ + 1)
Pt(τ)
)
. (5)
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We do not impose the Expectations Hypothesis: f $t (τ) 6= Et
[
y$t+τ (1)
]
.
We think of the FRM investor as paying the time-zero forward rate in each period on forward
contracts with delivery dates 1, 2, · · · , T . This assumption captures the essence of a nominal FRM:
future mortgage payments are fixed in nominal terms at the origination time 0.5 By the same token,
an ARM investor simply pays the short-rate
qFRMt = f
$
0 (t− 1), (6)
qARMt = y
$
t−1(1). (7)
In this world, the crucial difference between an FRM investor and an ARM investor is that the
former knows the value of all (nominal) mortgage payments at time 0, while the latter knows the
value of the (nominal) payments only one period in advance.
The difference between the expected mortgage payments for the FRM and ARM investors
equals the bond risk premium
E0
[
T∑
t=1
qFRMt
]
− E0
[
T∑
t=1
qARMt
]
=
T∑
t=1
f $0 (t− 1)−
T∑
t=1
E0
[
y$t−1(1)
]
= T
{
y$0(T )−
1
T
T∑
t=1
E0
[
y$t−1(1)
]}
≡ Tφ$0 (T ) , (8)
where we used that the yield on a T -period zero-coupon bond equals the average forward rate, and
where we defined φ$0(T ) as the risk premium on a T -period nominal bond. The FRM investor faces
no uncertainty over the nominal mortgage payments, whereas the ARM investor faces nominal
interest rate risk. The variability of ARM payments is 1
T
∑T
t=1Var0
[
y$t−1(1)
]
. Combining the
difference in expected payments and the difference in the variability of the payments, we arrive
at equation (9), which states that the investor prefers an ARM if the nominal bond risk premium
exceeds the variability of the nominal interest rate multiplied by the risk aversion coefficient
φ$0(T ) >
γ
T
T∑
t=1
Var0
[
y$t−1(1)
]
. (9)
If the protection that an FRM offers against nominal interest rate volatility to the nominal investor
is too expensive, an ARM becomes more attractive.
5For ease of exposition we do not impose that the FRM interest payments are equal over time, only that they
are known at time 0. Constant mortgage payments would be the harmonic mean of all forward rates of maturities
1, · · · , T . We comment further on this assumption in Section 2.4.
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2.2 Optimal Mortgage Choice: Real Mean-Variance Analysis
In a world with inflation, a rational investor cares about real consumption streams instead of
nominal streams. The only other differences with the previous set-up are that (1) the house price
now grows with inflation, and therefore has a constant real value, and (2) the labor income is i.i.d.
in real terms. The real payments on the two contracts now equal
qFRMt =
f $0 (t− 1)
Πt
= f $0 (t− 1) exp
(
−
t∑
s=1
πs
)
, (10)
qARMt =
y$t−1(1)
Πt
= y$t−1(1) exp
(
−
t∑
s=1
πs
)
, (11)
where Πt denotes the price level at time t and πt = logΠt − log Πt−1. We need to distinguish
between two types of investors: borrowing-constrained and unconstrained. The latter are able to
borrow cash to finance mortgage payments. We determine the optimal mortgage choice and its
determinants for each of these problems.
2.2.1 Borrowing-Constrained Investor
A borrowing-constrained investor maximizes (1) subject to (2), except that Cht , Lt, and q
h
t , for
h ∈ {ARM,FRM} now refer to real quantities, and that the last period consumption satisfies
ChT = LT − q
h
T + 1− exp
(
−
T∑
s=1
πs
)
,
Terminal consumption equals income after the mortgage payment plus the difference between the
real value of the house, which is 1, and the real mortgage balance, which is exp
(
−
∑T
s=1 πs
)
.
Using the fact that real labor income is independent of mortgage payments, the investor prefers
the ARM if
E0
[
T∑
t=1
qFRMt
]
+ γ
T−1∑
t=1
V ar0
[
qFRMt
]
+ γV ar0
[
qFRMT + exp
(
−
T∑
s=1
πs
)]
>
E0
[
T∑
t=1
qARMt
]
+ γ
T−1∑
t=1
V ar0
[
qARMt
]
+ γV ar0
[
qARMT + exp
(
−
T∑
s=1
πs
)]
. (12)
To further understand the main determinants of optimal mortgage choice in an inflationary
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environment, we make the following -admittedly crude- assumptions:
rt exp
(
−
t∑
s=1
πs
)
≈ rt
(
1−
t∑
s=1
πs
)
≈ rt, (13)
(1 + rt) exp
(
−
t∑
s=1
πs
)
≈ (1 + rt)
(
1−
t∑
s=1
πs
)
≈
(
1 + rt −
t∑
s=1
πs
)
, (14)
where r is a generic interest rate. The first approximation is a first-order Taylor expansion. The
second approximation says that an interest rate times aggregate inflation is an order of magnitude
smaller than the rate itself, if t is not too large. The approximations imply that the real payments
at time t on the FRM and ARM equal
qFRMt = f
$
0 (t− 1), (15)
qARMt = y
$
t−1(1). (16)
We now use this approximation to simplify the terms in the mortgage choice equation (12).
First, the expected payment differential between the FRM and the ARM in equation (12) is
still given by Tφ$0(T ), just as in (8). Under our approximation, the presence of inflation does
not affect the expected payments differential between the FRM and the ARM. For future use, we
rewrite the nominal bond risk premium as the sum of the inflation risk premium and the real rate
risk premium
φ$0(T ) = φ
x
0(T ) + φ
y
0(T ). (17)
Analogous to the nominal risk premium φ$0 in equation (8), we define the real rate risk premium at
time 0, φy0, as the difference between the observed long-term real rate and the expected long-term
real rate. The latter is the average of the expected future short real rates
φy0(T ) ≡ y0(T )−
1
T
T∑
t=1
E0 [yt−1(1)] , (18)
where yt(τ) is the real yield of a τ -period real bond at time t. We impose that the yield at time
t of an 1-period real bond, yt(1), is the difference between the 1-period nominal yield, y
$
t (1), and
1-period expected inflation, xt = xt(1)
yt(1) = y
$
t (1)− xt(1). (19)
Following Ang and Bekaert (2005), we define the expected inflation premium at time 0, φx0 , as
the difference between long-term nominal yields, long-term real yields, and long-term expected
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inflation
φx0(T ) ≡ y
$
0(T )− y0(T )− x0(T ). (20)
This uses the decomposition of realized inflation at time t into expected inflation conditional on
the time t− 1 information, xt−1, and unexpected inflation, εt
πt = xt−1 + εt, (21)
and uses the definition of the long-term expected inflation
xt(T ) =
1
T
Et [log Πt+T − log Πt] .
Second, the variance of the intermediate FRM payments, at times 1 through T − 1, is still
approximately zero (second term on the left-hand side of 12). The variance of the intermediate
ARM payments (second term on the right-hand side) is
∑T−1
t=1 Var0 [yt−1(1) + xt−1], where we used
equation (19). Intermediate payments on the ARM carry real rate risk and expected inflation risk,
while intermediate payments on the FRM carry no risk.
Third, we can rewrite the variance of the terminal payments (third term on left and right of
equation (12)) as
V ar0
[
qFRMT + exp
(
−
T∑
s=1
πs
)]
=
(
fFRM0 (T − 1) + 1
)2
Var0
[
exp
(
−
T∑
s=1
πs
)]
, (22)
V ar0
[
qARMT + exp
(
−
T∑
s=1
πs
)]
= Var0
[
(1 + yT−1) exp
(
−
T−1∑
s=1
πs − εT
)]
, (23)
where εT indicates unexpected inflation from T − 1 to T , using equation (21).
We thus have five possible determinants of mortgage choice: the real rate premium, the expected
inflation premium, the real rate variance, the inflation variance, and the covariance of the real
rate and expected inflation. First, an increase in either bond risk premium increases the expected
payments on the FRM and increases the uncertainty over its terminal payment. Second, an increase
in the real rate volatility increases the variance of both intermediate and terminal payments of the
ARM contract. The covariance between the real rate and expected inflation increases the variance
of the intermediate payments to be made on the ARM. The impact of inflation volatility is more
complex. An increase in inflation uncertainty increases the variance of the intermediate payments
on the ARM, but not on the FRM. In contrast, the terminal payment of the ARM is hedged against
expected inflation from period T − 1 to T , while the terminal payment for the FRM is not. We
conjecture that the larger inflation uncertainty over the first T − 1 periods, associated with the
ARM, is likely to dominate the larger inflation uncertainty over the final payment, associated with
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the FRM. This makes the ARM contract carry the most inflation risk for a borrowing-constrained
investor. In sum, we predict that the ARM share relates positively to the inflation risk premium and
the real rate risk premium, but negatively to the real rate volatility and the covariance between the
real rate and expected inflation. If households are borrowing constrained, the ARM share relates
negatively to inflation volatility.
2.2.2 Unconstrained Investor
We now consider an investor that is not borrowing constrained. The availability of a risk-free
credit line to borrow against enables the ARM investor to eliminate the expected inflation risk.
The reason is that the ARM investor can effectively shift forward the increase in intermediate
mortgage payments, arising from increased expected inflation, to time T . The additional amount
borrowed exactly cancels against the erosion of the nominal mortgage balance due to expected
inflation. This greatly reduces the inflation risk of the ARM contract (see also Campbell (2006)).
The FRM contract does not admit such a strategy. After all, the intermediate payments are not
affected by inflation (to a first-order approximation). Since the terminal payment on the FRM
carries inflation risk, it is the FRM contract which carries the most inflation risk. This is the
opposite scenario as for a constrained investor, where the ARM contract was the one carrying the
most inflation risk.6 The prediction for the unconstrained investor is that the ARM share relates
positively to inflation volatility.
2.3 The Yield Spread as a Predictor of the ARM Share
Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Campbell (2006) have argued that the slope of the yield curve is
a key determinant of mortgage choice. They argue that when nominal long-term interest rates are
high compared to nominal short-term rates, ARMs seem attractive relative to FRMs.
Condition (24) shows why the yield spread may be an imperfect measure of the relative attrac-
tiveness of both mortgage types. Consider the following decomposition of the nominal yield spread
into the nominal bond risk premium and the deviations of average expected future short rates and
the current nominal short rate,
y$0(T )− y
$
0(1) = φ
$
0(T ) +
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
E0
[
y$t−1(1)
]
− y$0(1)
)
(24)
In a homoscedastic world with zero risk premia (φ$0(T ) = 0), the yield spread equals the difference
6Note that an unconstrained FRM investor could hedge inflation risk by borrowing cash and investing in long-
term nominal bonds. This would effectively transform the FRM into an ARM so that the investor might as well
opt for the ARM to begin with.
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between the average expected future short rates and the current short rate. Since long-term bond
rates are the average of current and expected future short rates, both the FRM and the ARM
investor will face the same expected payment stream in this world. The yield spread is completely
uninformative about mortgage choice. Likewise, in a world with constant risk premia, variations
in the yield spread capture variations in deviations between expected future short rates and the
current short rate. But again, these variations are priced into both the ARM and FRM contracts.
It is only the bond risk premium which affects the mortgage choice for a risk averse investor. A
second way of seeing what goes wrong is to think of the current FRM-ARM rate spread as the
determinant of mortgage choice. This measure deducts from the current FRM rate (long-term
bond rate) the current ARM rate (one-period interest rate). Equation (24) shows that the correct
proxy for the bond risk premium, and hence for mortgage choice, subtracts from the FRM rate
the average future ARM rate (expected future one-period interest rate). Indeed, the latter is the
actual rate that the ARM investor will have to pay over the life of the mortgage.
In our model with time-varying risk premia, estimated below, it turns out that the two terms
on the right-hand side of (24) are negatively correlated. This makes the yield spread a poor proxy
for the nominal bond risk premium, and as we show empirically below, a weak determinant of
mortgage choice.
2.4 Variables Predicting Mortgage Choice
We choose the real rate risk premium, expected inflation risk premium, and the variance of both
the real rate and expected inflation as the four term-structure predictor variables of mortgage
choice in Section 4. There are at least four reasons to consider these four variables separately:
aggregation, money illusion, borrowing constraints, and prepayment. We discuss them in turn.
Aggregation The analysis in Section 2.1 and 2.2 pertains to an individual investor’s mortgage
choice. Since we are interested in explaining the dynamics of the fraction of households that
prefers an ARM, we need to aggregate across individuals. This necessitates understanding how
heterogeneity within the pool of FRM- and ARM- holders affects the choice of predictor variables
in the ARM regressions. For simplicity, we consider mortgage choice in a nominal world. The
aggregation argument is similar in a world with inflation.
We consider a cross-section of investors indexed by j = 1, . . . , J that differ in terms of their risk
attitudes (γj) and in terms of the maturities of their FRM mortgage contracts (Tj). Condition (9)
implies that household j prefers the ARM if
φx0(Tj) + φ
y
0(Tj) >
γj
Tj
Tj∑
t=1
Var0 [yt−1(1) + xt−1] .
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For a single investor, the choice between an FRM and an ARM only depends on the sum of the
two risk premia φx0(Tj)+φ
y
0(Tj) and the variance of the sum of expected inflation and the real rate.
Heterogeneity forces us to include all four variables separately however.
Since we do not observe the individual mortgage maturities Tj, we use either five-year or ten-year
bond risk premia to proxy for the risk premia φx0(Tj) and φ
y
0(Tj). Bonds with different maturities
will have different exposures to the real interest rate and expected inflation. If both risk premia are
driven by a single factor, including the nominal bond risk premium φx0(T ) + φ
y
0(T ), with T = 5 or
10, as an explanatory variable in the ARM share regression would be appropriate. However, if two
factors are needed to capture the variation in both bond risk premia, then the nominal bond risk
premium is no longer the correct explanatory variable for the aggregate mortgage choice. Instead,
we must use the real rate premium and expected inflation premium as two separate explanatory
variables. As it turns out, a single-factor model does not fit the data well; the correlation between
the 5-year and 10-year nominal bond risk premium is only 88%. Since most FRM mortgage
contracts have a thirty-year maturity, the correlation between the relevant bond risk premium and
our five- or ten-year proxies may be even lower.
The same argument applies to the average volatility of the real interest rate and expected
inflation. Only their sum matters for a single investor, but their individual components matter
in the aggregate if the volatility proxy that we use does not match the maturity of the investor’s
contract exactly.
Money Illusion and Borrowing Constraints Money illusion, as in Brunnermeier and Julliard
(2006), or the presence of borrowing constraints are additional motivations to consider the two
volatilities separately. High expected inflation volatility (V xt ) makes the ARM more risky for
“nominal” investors as these investors are inapt to disentangle real rates and expected inflation
(Section 2.1). The same is true for “real” investors who are borrowing constrained (Section 2.2.1).
In contrast, for unconstrained real investors, high expected inflation volatility makes the FRM more
risky (Section 2.2.2). This implies that we predict a positive sign in the ARM share regressions on
expected inflation volatility if money illusion or borrowing constraints are important for aggregate
mortgage choice. We predict a negative sign if rational, unconstrained investors drive aggregate
mortgage choice.
Prepayment Third, FRM contracts in the US contain a prepayment option (the details on
prepayment are in Section 5). If the four term structure variables affect the option value differently,
we need to include them separately in the ARM share regressions. The linear regression can be
interpreted as a first-order expansion of the non-linear relationship between between mortgage
rates and therefore mortgage choice on the one hand and the two risk premia and volatilities on
the other hand.
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3 VAR model
We set up a VAR model to construct long-term inflation and real interest rate expectations that
are needed to estimate real interest rate and expected inflation risk premia.7 We allow for het-
eroscedasticity in the innovations. This structure will turn out to be valuable to understand how
exactly the two risk premia and the two conditional volatilities affect mortgage choice, analyzed
later in Section 4.
3.1 VAR Setup
Our state vector Y contains the one-year (y$t (12) ), the five-year (y
$
t (60)), and the ten-year nominal
yields (y$t (120)), as well as realized, one-year log inflation (πt(12) = logΠt − log Πt−12). On the
right-hand side of the VAR(1) is the 12-month lag of the state variables. Time (t) is expressed in
months and we use overlapping monthly observations.8 The law of motion for the state is
Yt+12 = µ+ ΓYt + ηt+12, with ηt+12 | It ∼ D(0,Σt), (25)
with It representing the information at time-t. We specify the conditional volatility matrix Σt
below.
We start by constructing the 1-year expected inflation series as a function of the state vector
xt(12) = Et [πt+12(12)] = e
′
4µ+ e
′
4ΓYt, (26)
where e4 is the fourth unit vector. We construct the 1-year real short rate by subtracting expected
inflation from the 1-year nominal rate (see (19))
yt(12) = y
$
t (12)− xt(12) = −e
′
4µ+ (e
′
1 − e
′
4Γ)Yt. (27)
Next, we use the VAR structure to determine the n-year expectations of the average inflation and
the average real rate in terms of the state variables. For expected average inflation this becomes
xt(12× n) =
1
n
Et
[
n∑
i=1
e′4Yt+(12×n)
]
=
(
1
n
)
e′4
{
n∑
i=1
(
i−1∑
j=0
Γjµ
)
+
n∑
i=1
ΓiYt
}
. (28)
7The VAR offers an alternative way to form inflation expectations to the professional analyst survey data, used
in the introduction. In addition, it allows us to form real rate risk premia.
8We have also estimated the model on quarterly data and found very similar results.
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The long-run expected average real rate is also a function of the current state
yt(12× n) =
1
n
Et
[
n−1∑
i=0
yt+(12×i)(12)
]
=
(
1
n
)
e′1
{
n−1∑
i=1
(
i−1∑
j=0
Γjµ
)
+
n−1∑
i=1
ΓiYt
}
+
e′1Yt
n
− xt(12× n). (29)
With the long-term expected real rate from (29) in hand, we can form the real risk premium by
subtracting this expectation from the observed real rate (as in (18)). Similarly, with the long-term
expected inflation from (28) in hand, we form the inflation risk premium as the difference between
the observed nominal yield, the observed real yield, and expected inflation (as in (20)).
We now turn to the model for the volatility of the real interest rate and expected inflation.
We first estimate the innovations (ηˆt, t = 1, . . . , T ) from the VAR-model and construct the implied
innovations to the real rate and expected inflation according to (30) and (31),
ηxt+12 = xt+12(12)− Et [xt+12(12)] = e
′
4Γηt+12, (30)
ηyt+12 = yt+12(12)− Et [yt+12(12)] = (e
′
1 − e
′
4Γ) ηt+12. (31)
Next, we model both conditional variances as an exponentially affine function in their own level
V xt ≡ Vart [xt+12(12)] = Vart
[
ηxt+12
]
= exp(αx + βxxt(12)), (32)
V yt ≡ Vart [yt+12(12)] = Vart
[
ηyt+12
]
= exp(αy + βyyt(12)). (33)
The coefficients αi and βi, i = x, y, are estimated consistently via non-linear least squares
(αˆi, βˆi) = argmin
αi,βi
1
T
T∑
t=1
([
ηˆit×12
]2
− exp(αi + βiit×12(12))
)2
.
3.2 VAR Estimation Results
We estimate a VAR-model with monthly observations for the period 1985.1-2006.6. Monthly
nominal yield data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.9 The inflation rate is based
on monthly CPI-U available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.10 We start the model in 1985, near
the end of the Volcker deflation. Our stationary, one-regime model would be unfit to estimate the
entire post-war history (see Ang and Bekaert (2005)). Estimating the model at monthly frequency
gives us a sufficiently many observations (258 months). The VAR(1) structure with the 12-month
9The nominal yield data is available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006.
10The inflation data is available at http://www.bls.gov.
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lag on the right-hand side is parsimonious and delivers plausible long-term expectations.11
Figure 3 shows the results from the estimation. The top left panel shows the 1-year expected
inflation xt as well as the 1-year real rate yt, computed from (26) and (27). The bottom two panels
show the long-term expectations of the same variables at the five- and ten-year horizons, computed
from (28) and (29) respectively. Expected inflation is relatively smooth at all horizons; its values
are nearly identical at the five-year and ten-year horizons. It is 2.9% per year on average; higher
at the beginning of the sample (3.48% in 1985.2) and lower near the end of the sample (2.46%
in 2004.3). Interestingly, the survey data on long-term expected inflation, which we used in the
introduction, show a similar pattern. They are also nearly constant albeit at a slightly lower level of
2.5%. Real rate expectations display more variation over time. At the one-year horizon, real yields
hover between -2% (2004) and 6% per year (1984). At the ten-year horizon, these expectations are
smoother. They hover between 0.5% and 3.5%, but show the same pattern of fluctuations.
The top right panel plots the conditional volatilities of expected inflation and the real rate
(see equations (32) and (33)). Conditional real rate volatility is 1.06% per year on average, while
expected inflation volatility is three times lower at 0.35% per year on average. There is some time
variation in these one-year ahead conditional volatilities. The two conditional volatilities co-move
strongly negatively; their correlation is -0.71. For example, real rate volatility is high in 2004,
when the real rate is low, and low in the 1985, when the real rate is high. In contrast, expected
inflation volatility is at its highest level in 1991, when expected inflation is high, and low in 2002,
when expected inflation is low.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Combining data on nominal and real five-year and ten-year yields, we form the real rate and
expected inflation risk premia. The real yield data is from McCulloch.12 The left panel of Figure 4
plots the risk premia at a five-year horizon, while the right panel plots the ten-year horizon premia.
The figure starts in July of 1997, the first period for which five-year and ten-year real yield data
are available in the US. Expected inflation risk premia in both panels are negative until 2004. This
negative risk premium not surprising given the fact that the observed spread between nominal and
real yields is often below 2% and inflation expectations are always above 2%. Most of the action
in this spread is inherited by the inflation risk premium because expected inflation is estimated
to be nearly constant. The ten-year risk premium varies between -1.65% in 1998.8 and +0.35% in
2004.4. The real rate premium on the other hand is estimated to be positive, and varies between
0.8% per year in 2005.5 and 2.9% in 2002.1 at the ten-year horizon.
11As a robustness check, we also considered a VAR(2)-model. Below we redo the ARM share regressions for the
term structure variables arising from that model.
12The real yield data is available at http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/ts/ts.html. As a robustness check,
we perform our analysis with real yield data generated by the term structure model of Ang and Bekaert (2005). We
show below that our main conclusions are unaffected.
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[Figure 4 about here.]
The two risk premia have a negative correlation of -0.64 and -0.59 at the five-year, and ten-year
horizons respectively. Because of this negative correlation, the nominal risk premium, cancels out
a lot of interesting variation that is in the component risk premia. Unsurprisingly, this sum will
turn out to be less informative for mortgage choice than its components.
3.3 Extending the Sample of Bond Risk Premia
The unavailability of real yield data before 1997.7 prevents us from studying mortgage choice in
the US before this date using the same methodology. After all, we use the real term structure data
to disentangle the real rate and expected inflation risk premium. We now develop a projection
method that allows us to extend the sample back to 1985. This exercise is best interpreted as a
robustness check.
The data on nominal yields and realized inflation, but also on the nominal bond risk premium
(obtained from the VAR) go back to 1985. What we are missing is the decomposition of the
nominal bond risk premium into its two components: the inflation risk premium and the real rate
risk premium. We construct a long time series for the real interest rate premium by first regressing
the real rate risk premium on a set of state variables zt that are observable over the complete
sample period. Specifically, we estimate the regression
φyt = α+ β
′zt + ǫt, (34)
over the period 1997:7-2006:6, and construct the real rate risk premium for the full sample period
using the estimated coefficients φˆ
y
t = αˆ+ βˆ
′
zt. Since the nominal risk premium is available for the
entire sample, we back out the inflation rate risk premium as the difference between the nominal
risk premium and the projected real rate risk premium. This method gives reliable answers as long
as (i) the relationship between risk premia and the state variables zt does not change dramatically
over the sample period and (ii) the state variables capture most of the variation in the risk premia.
With these considerations in mind, we select zt = (Y
′
t , Y
′
t−1)
′, where Yt contains the VAR
variables and time measured in years. A regression of the ten-year (five-year) real rate premium on
z gives an in-sample R2 of 90% (86%). Figure 5 shows the observed nominal bond risk premium
{φ$t} (solid black line) together with its projected components (lines with circles) at the ten-year
horizon. It also overlays the risk premia shown in the left panel of Figure 4 for the 1997.7-2006.6
period. The projections are close to these risk premia estimates. Interestingly, the projections
indicate that inflation risk premia where higher (and often positive) before 1995. Real rate risk
premia came down from 4% in 1985 to 2% in 1997.
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[Figure 5 about here.]
4 ARM Share Regressions
We are interested in explaining time variation in the fraction of all newly-originated mortgages
that is of the adjustable-rate type. In this section, we regress the ARM share on the one-period lag
of the term structure variables, motivated in Section 2 and computed from the VAR in Section 3.
These include the real rate premium, the expected inflation premium, the real rate volatility, and
the expected inflation volatility. We lag the predictor variables for one period in order to study
what changes in this month’s risk premia and volatilities imply for next month’s mortgage choice.
In addition, the use of lagged regressors mitigates potential endogeneity problems that would arise
if mortgage choice affected the term structure of interest rates.
4.1 Data on the ARM Share in the U.S.
Our baseline data series is from the Federal Housing Financing Board. It is based on the Monthly
Interest Rate Survey, a survey sent out to mortgage lenders.13 These data include loan originations
for both newly constructed homes and existing homes. The monthly data start in 1985.1 and run
until 2006.6, and we label this series {ARM1t }. Our baseline measure of the ARM share includes
all adjustable mortgages. In particular, it includes hybrid mortgages which have an initial fixed-
interest rate payment period. Starting in 1992, we also know the decomposition of the ARM by
initial fixed-rate period.14 This allows us to construct two “stricter” measures of the ARM share.
The first alternative measure includes only those ARMs with an initial fixed-rate period of five
years or less. It omits the ARMs with an intial fixed-rate period of seven and ten years, so called
7/1 and 10/1 hybrids, as well as miscellaneous loans with initial fixed-rate period greater than 5
years. We label this series {ARM2t }. The second alternative measure, {ARM
3
t }, contains only
ARMs with initial fixed-rate period of 3 years (3/1), one year (1/1), and miscellaneous loans with
initial fixed-rate period less than one year. Finally, there is an alternative source of ARM share
data available from Freddie-Mac, which constructs a monthly ARM share based on the Primary
Mortgage Market Survey.15 This series, which we label {ARM4t }, conceptually measures the same
13Major lenders are asked to report the terms and conditions on all conventional, single-family, fully-amortizing,
purchase-money loans closed the last five working days of the month. The data thus excludes FHA-insured and
VA-guaranteed mortgages, refinancing loans, and balloon loans. The data for our last sample month, June 2006, is
based on 21,801 reported loans from 74 lenders, representing savings associations, mortgage companies, commercial
banks, and mutual savings banks. The data is weighted to reflect the shares of mortgage lending by lender size and
lender type as reported in the latest release of the Federal Reserve Board’s Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data.
14We are very grateful to James Vickery for making these detailed data available to us.
15This survey goes out to 125 lenders. The share is constructed based on the dollar volume of conventional
mortgage originations within the 1-unit Freddie Mac loan limit as reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
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as {ARM1t }, and is available from 1995.1. Figure 6 plots all four series together, starting in 1992.1.
The correlation between measure 2 (measure 3) and our benchmark measure 1 is 98.6% (86.3%).
The correlation between measure 4 and our benchmark is 89.9%.
[Figure 6 about here.]
4.2 Regression Results
We start by reporting univariate regressions of the benchmark ARM share on the one-period lag
of the term structure variables we identified. Table 1 shows the slope coefficient, its Newey-West
t-statistic using 12 lags, and the regression R2 for seventeen different explanatory variables. The
first panel contains the four term structure variables we propose.
Our main focus is on the 1997.7-2006.6 sample, for which we have real term structure data.16
The single strongest explanatory variable of variation in the ARM share is the expected inflation
risk premium at the five-year horizon. It has a t-statistic of 8.49, and explains 63.5% of the
variation in the ARM share. A 1 percentage point, or two-standard deviation, increase in the
expected inflation risk premium increases the ARM share by 12.7 percentage points. The inflation
risk premium has to be paid by the FRM holder (the investor). An increase in the inflation
risk premium makes the FRM relatively less attractive and increases the ARM share. Figure 2
in the introduction confirms that the two variables co-move remarkably. The ten-year inflation
risk premium looks very similar to the five-year risk premium (see Figure 4) and has a similar
explanatory power of 56.2%. Interestingly, the expected inflation risk premium continues to be
strongly related to the ARM share in the full sample 1985.1-2006.6 (left columns). The larger point
estimate suggests an even larger sensitivity of the ARM share to the inflation risk premium over
the full sample. The t-statistic of φxt (5), constructed from the projection exercise in in Section 3.3,
equals 5.9, and the regression R2 is still 44%.
All other variables explain a much smaller fraction of the variation in the ARM share in the US.
First, the real rate risk premium has the right sign in the full sample, but its correlation with the
ARM share is lower. Only the real rate premium at the ten-year horizon is statistically significantly
related to the ARM share; the R2 is 12%. This correlation has the wrong sign in the 1997.7-2006.6
sample. Second, the VAR allows us to compute the 1-year ahead conditional variances V xt and V
y
t ,
and to include those in the regression.17 In contrast to the risk premia, these conditional variances
Act (HMDA) for 2004.
16We do not use the first six months of 1997, in which only a five-year TIPS was available. As a robustness check,
we have also repeated all regressions starting in 1999.1, because the TIPS market may have suffered from liquidity
problems early on (see Shen and Corning (2001), Jarrow and Yildirim (2003), and Ang and Bekaert (2005)). The
regression results starting in 1999 are very similar to the ones reported here.
17Equation (12) calls for the average of the 1-period- to T-period-ahead conditional variances instead. Because
these long-term average variances increase are positively correlated with the 1-period-ahead conditional variance,
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are available for the entire 1985-2006 sample (see top right panel of Figure 3). Univariately, we find
that a higher volatility of the real rate make the ARM less desirable, consistent with the model.
We also find that a higher inflation volatility makes the FRM (ARM) less (more) desirable. As
pointed out in Section 2.4, the positive sign on the conditional volatility of expected inflation is
consistent with a rational investor who is unconstrained, and not with an investor with money
illusion or with binding constraints. We note that the volatility of the nominal interest rate is also
significantly negatively related to the ARM share in the full sample (not reported). Most of the
conditional variance of the nominal rate is inherited by the conditional variance of the real rate;
the two have a correlation of 95%.
[Table 1 about here.]
Turning to the multivariate regressions in Table 2, the importance of the expected inflation risk
premium as a determinant of the ARM share remains unchanged. In a first regression, we include
both the expected inflation and the real rate risk premium at the ten-year horizon. Column
(5) reports the results for the sample for which we have real yield data, while the first column
reports the full sample results using risk premia series based on the projection method.18 Both
variables enter with the right sign, but only the inflation risk premium is significant. Compared
to the univariate regression, the R2 improves marginally: from 56.2 to 56.8% for the 1997-206
sample and from 44.6 to 46.3% for the full sample, respectively. Next, we add the two volatility
terms as regressors in columns (2) and (6). They both enter with the right sign in both samples.
Inflation volatility makes the ARM more desirable, whereas real rate volatility makes the ARM
less attractive. The real rate volatility is significant in the full sample. The R2 improves by 7.5% in
the full sample and by 4.1% in the 1997-2006 sample. The coefficient on the real rate risk premium
turns negative, but is insignificant.19
Noteworthy is that the coefficient on the inflation risk premium is stable across both samples;
it is always around 15. The results with five-year risk premia instead of ten-year risk premia are
very similar (not reported). The R2 with five-year risk premia is 63.8% in the 97-06 sample and
also 53.5% in the full sample. Again, for the 97-06 sample, adding the other three term structure
variables barely improves on the fit of the univariate regression. In the US, the expected inflation
risk premium turns out to be the most important determinant of mortgage choice.
the sign on V xt and V
y
t should be the same. The reason is that the term-structure of volatilities is upward sloping.
It converges to the unconditional variance, which is higher than the 1-period-ahead conditional variance.
18We use the projection for the entire 1985-2006 sample.
19We also studied a regression with the two risk premia and the conditional variance of the nominal interest
rate. The regression coefficient is negative and significant in the full sample, and negative but not significant in the
later sample. Finally, we also studied a regression which adds the conditional covariance between the real rate and
expected inflation to the four determinants in column. The explanatory power is the same. We do not report these
results because the signs on the variance terms loose their independent interpretation. The reason is that there is
no variation in the conditional covariance that is not already in the conditional variances because the correlation
between x and y is assumed to be constant.
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[Table 2 about here.]
Other Term-Structure Variables The second panel of Table 1 compares the univariate ex-
planatory power of the inflation risk premium to that of other variables. The nominal bond risk
premium, which is the sum of the expected inflation and real rate risk premia, is a much weaker
determinant than its components. The reason is that its components are negatively correlated.
We have argued in Section 2.4 that aggregation of mortgage choice across heterogenous investors
necessitates including both risk premia in the regression separately.
Next, we consider the spread of the five- and ten-year yield over the one-year yield. Neither
yield spread is significant in either sample. The R2 never exceeds 1%. We have argued in Section
2.3 that the yield spread not only measures the nominal risk premium, but also the deviation of
the expected future short rate from the current short rate. Our VAR analysis shows that these
two components are negatively related. This makes the yield spread a contaminated predictor of
mortgage choice. Columns (3) and (7) of Table 2 show that there is no extra information in the
yield spread that is useful for predicting the ARM share, and not already present in the other four
variables. They add the orthogonal component of the yield spread as an explanatory variable of
the ARM share. The R2 does not increase and its coefficient is insignificant. Returning to Table
1, the last row of the second panel considers the spread between the FRM and the ARM rate.20
The motivation for using this spread is the same as for the one for using the yield spread. Both
measure a long maturity - short maturity differential. The FRM-ARM spread has equally little
explanatory power in the 1997-2006 sample. But, it is significant in the full sample with an R2 of
35%, whereas the government bond yield spread is not. Clearly, the FRM-ARM spread contains
additional information unrelated to the term premium.21 To get at this additional information, we
orthogonalize the FRM-ARM spread to the 10-1 yield spread and regress the ARM share on the
orthogonal component. For the full sample, we find a strongly significant effect. Section 7 suggests
one possible explanation for this finding.
The short-term and long-term government bond yield levels, as well as the effective fixed-rate
or adjustable-rate mortgage rates are all weak explanatory variables of the ARM share in the 1997-
2006 sample (third panel of Table 1). In the full sample, the R2 are higher, but not as high as for
the expected inflation risk premium. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the bond yields and
mortgage rates seems related to that of the expected inflation risk premium. They are positively
correlated with the inflation risk premium in the full sample, but negatively correlated in the later
20We use the effective rate data from the Federal Housing Financing Board, Table 23. The effective rate adjusts
the contractual rate for the discounted value of initial fees and charges. The FRM-ARM spreads with and without
fees have a correlation of .998.
21The correlation between the FRM-ARM spread and the ten-one-year government bond yield spread is only 32%
over the full sample, and 11% over the 1997-2006 sample. This spread also captures the value of the prepayment
option (see below), as well as the lenders’ profit margin differential on the FRM and ARM contracts.
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sample.
Robustness: Other ARM Share Measures As a robustness exercise, we repeat the analysis
in Column (6) of Table 2 for the alternative measures of the ARM share discussed above. The
second and third column of Table 3 show that the explanatory power of the term structure variables
is very similar without the hybrid mortgages. In the second column we count the hybrid ARM
contracts with initial fixed-rate period greater than five years as FRMs. The average fraction of
ARMs falls from 21.6% to 18.1%, but the results remain virtually unchanged. In the third column,
we also eliminate the mortgages with an initial fixed-rate period greater than three years. The
average fraction of ARMs drops to 11%, half as much as in Column (1). The R2 drops by almost 20
percentage points, but the inflation risk premium remains highly significant. The real rate volatility
now also becomes significant. We conclude that our results are robust to the classification of the
hybrid mortgage contracts. In Column (4), we use the Freddie Mac data instead of the FHFB data.
This makes little difference compared to Column 1. The R2 is the highest for this measure, and
equal to 64%. Finally, we also experiment with splitting up the ARMs in Column (1) into mortgage
contracts for newly constructed homes and mortgages for existing structures (not reported in the
table). The average fraction of ARM shares is 28% for the former group and 20% for the latter. The
inflation risk premium is a highly significant determinant of mortgage choice in both groups. The
R2, however, is twice as high (68%) for the existing structures group than for the new-construction
group (34%).
[Table 3 about here.]
Robustness: Alternative Interest Rate Models We have studied how the ARM share re-
gressions are affected when we change the underlying term structure model. We have estimated a
VAR(2)-model for Y instead of a VAR(1). The inflation and real rate risk premia in the VAR(2)
model look qualitatively similar to those in Figure 4. The only small difference is that the long-
term expected inflation is estimated to be somewhat lower (around 2% per year), so that the
inflation risk premium is higher near the end of the sample, and the increase in the inflation risk
premium since 2003 is more pronounced. We then rerun the ARM share regressions, corresponding
to Columns (2) and (6) in Table 2. The inflation risk premium is as prominent an explanatory
variable as in the benchmark analysis. The R2 on the regression further improves to 70.5% in the
second sample (from 61%), and to 57.6% in the full sample (from 53.9%).
We also verified the robustness of our results to alternative volatility models for the expected
inflation and the real rate in (32) and (34). This comparison showed that the benchmark volatility
model has the lowest sum of squared deviation between the squared innovations and the proposed
conditional volatility. Further, because the difference between alternative volatility models is rela-
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tively small, the ARM share regressions provide similar results for alternative conditional volatility
series.
Robustness: Alternative Real Yield Measures Due to the availability of TIPS data, our
main results are for the 1997-2006 sample. We have used the projection method as a first robust-
ness exercise to verify whether our results extend to the longer 1985-2006 sample. As a further
robustness check, we use the real yield data backed-out from the term structure model of Ang and
Bekaert (2005) instead of the TIPS yields. We proceed as in Section 3, forming inflation and real
rate expectations in the same way. We treat the real yields as observed, and use them to construct
the inflation risk premium and the real rate premium in turn. Since the Ang-Bekaert data are
quarterly (1985.IV-2004.IV), we construct the quarterly ARM share as the simple average of the
three monthly ARM share observations in that quarter. We then regress the quarterly ARM share
on the one-quarter lagged inflation and real rate risk premium. We find that both enter with the
correct, positive sign, and both coefficients are statistically significant. The Newey-West t-statistic
on the inflation risk premium is 3.9 and the t-statistic on the real rate risk premium is 2.12. The
regression R2 is 53%. Including the quarterly-sampled conditional volatility terms increases the
R2 further to 70%, while increasing the importance of the inflation risk premium. Our results are
therefore robust to an alternative, model-implied measurement of real yields.
Robustness: Persistence of Regressor In contrast to the inflation risk premium, most term
structure variables in Table 1 do not explain much of the variation in the ARM share. This is
especially true in the 1997-2006 sample. This suggests that our results for the inflation risk premium
are not simply an artifact of regressing a persistent regressand on a persistent regressor, because
many of the other term structure variables are at least as persistent. One further robustness
check we performed is to regress quarterly changes in the ARM share (between periods t and
t + 3) on changes in the four term structure variables of the benchmark regression specification
(between periods t− 1 and t). We continue to find a positive and strongly significant effect of the
inflation risk premium on the ARM share. The magnitude of the regression coefficients implies
that a one percentage point increase in the inflation risk premium increases the ARM share by
15.5 percentage points in the full sample and 11.6 in the 1997-2006 sample, all else equal. These
sensitivities are consistent with our findings for the level regressions. The R2 of the regression
in changes is obviously lower, but still substantial: 20.8% in the full sample and 17.0% in the
1997-2006 sample.
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5 Prepayment Option
Sofar we have ignored one other potentially important determinant of mortgage choice: the pre-
payment option. In the US, an FRM contract typically has an embedded prepayment option
which allows the mortgage borrower to pay off the loan at will. In this section we first discuss
the anatomy of the fixed-rate mortgage with prepayment option and relate it to other, traded,
fixed-income securities. Next we show how the presence of the prepayment option affects mortgage
choice in a model that accommodates time-varying prices of risk and volatilities.
5.1 Anatomy of a Fixed-Rate Mortgage
A fixed-rate mortgage without prepayment option is a coupon-bearing nominal bond, issued by
the borrower and held by the lender.22 An FRM with prepayment option is a callable bond.
The borrower has the right to prepay the outstanding mortgage debt at any point in time; the
prepayment option is of the American type. The price sensitivity of a callable bond to interest
rate shocks differs from that of a regular bond. Figure 7 plots the price sensitivity of an FRM
without prepayment (regular bond) and an FRM with prepayment (callable bond) to changes in
the real rate (top panel) and expected inflation (bottom panel). The model that produces this
figure is explained below. The regular bond price is decreasing and convex in both the real interest
rate and expected inflation. The callable bond price is decreasing in x and y, but the relationship
becomes concave when the call option is in the money, i.e., when the real rate or expected inflation
are low. This implies that the price of a callable bond is less sensitive to interest rate changes.
This reduced exposure is most pronounced with respect to expected inflation (bottom panel). In
sum, the FRM with prepayment has positive, but diminished exposure to real rate and expected
inflation. This implies that the expected payments to the FRM with prepayment increase with the
real rate and expected inflation risk premium, but not as much as the FRM without prepayment.
[Figure 7 about here.]
5.2 Valuing the Option in the VAR Framework
We now turn to the valuation the prepayment option. Valuation of this option is based on a
numerical dynamic programming algorithm that determines optimal refinancing decisions (see
also Pliska (2006)). Due to computational limitations, the algorithm cannot handle the four-
dimensional state variable that arises in the VAR(1) model of Section 3. We use a reduced,
three-dimensional model instead for the option valuation, and denote the corresponding variables
22This analogy is exact for an interest-only mortgage. When the mortgage balance is paid off during the contrac-
tual period (amortizing), the loan can be thought of as a portfolio of bonds with maturities equal to the dates on
which the downpayments occur. Acharya and Carpenter (2002) discuss the valuation of callable, defaultable bonds.
23
with a ‘⋆’ superscript. The state vector, Y ⋆t , is comprised of the real rate, expected inflation, and
realized inflation, Y ⋆t = (yt(12), xt(12), πt(12)). The time series for {xt} and {yt} are taken from
the large VAR model of Section 3. The law of motion for the state is
Y ⋆t+12 = µ
⋆ + Γ⋆Y ⋆t + η
⋆
t+12, where η
⋆
t+12 | It ∼ N(0,Σ
⋆
t ), (35)
where we assume that the innovations are conditionally normally distributed. The conditional
variance matrix is given by
Σ⋆t = diag
(√
exp(α⋆1 + β
⋆
1Yt(1)), . . . ,
√
exp(α⋆3 + β
⋆
3Y
⋆
t(3))
)
× Ω⋆ ×
diag
(√
exp(α⋆1 + β
⋆
1Yt(1)), . . . ,
√
exp(α⋆3 + β
⋆
3Y
⋆
t(3))
)
.
We further assume that the nominal log pricing kernel m$t+1 reads
−m$t+12 = yt(12) + xt(12) +
1
2
Λ′tΣ
⋆
tΛt + Λ
′
tη
⋆
t+12, (36)
with market prices of risk Λt. Following the literature on affine term structure models (e.g., Dai
and Singleton (2002) and Duffee (2002)), the market prices of risk Λt, are assumed to be affine
functions of the state vector
Λt = λ0 + Λ
′
1Y
⋆
t . (37)
We relegate the discussion of the estimation of the market prices of risk to Appendix A.
The price of the prepayment option is the difference between the rate on a fixed-rate mortgage
with prepayment and a (hypothetical) rate on an FRM without prepayment. Let the nominal value
to the lender of the former contract be V pt (Y
⋆
t , rt), and the value of the latter contract V
np
t (Y
⋆
t , rt),
where rt is the contractual mortgage rate. The time-t values are determined after the time-t interest
payment is made and after the prepayment decision has been made. We assume that there are
no costs to prepay and that the borrower prepays optimally.23 As before, the face value of the
loan is normalized to $1. Finally, we assume that there is perfect competition in the mortgage
market. Competition implies that the present value of payments must equal the value of the loan
at origination. The implied zero-profit mortgage rate at time t, denoted rˆht with h ∈ {p, np},
satisfies
V pt (Y
⋆
t , rˆ
p
t ) = V
np
t (Y
⋆
t , rˆ
np
t ) = 1, ∀t = 0, · · · , T. (38)
At maturity T , this condition simply states that the principal is paid back in full. The zero-
23Under this assumption, prepayment behavior is fully driven by the dynamics of the term structure of interest
rates. We do not consider sub-optimal prepayment behavior and the premium associated with it (see Gabaix,
Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2006)).
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profit rate will be a function of the state Y ⋆t and will be different for the FRM with and without
prepayment. The contract values can be solved for recursively, working backwards from time T .
The recursion at time t reads
V npt (Y
⋆
t , rt) = Et
[
exp
(
m$t+1
) (
rt + V
np
t+1(Y
⋆
t+1, rt)
)]
, (39)
V pt (Y
⋆
t , rt) = Et
[
exp
(
m$t+1
) (
rt +min
{
1, V npt+1(Y
⋆
t+1, rt)
})]
. (40)
The minimum operator in equation (40) reflects the prepayment option: the borrower will prepay
at time t + 1 whenever the rate on a new loan is lower than the rate on the existing loan. This
is the case when V npt+1(Y
⋆
t+1, rt) > 1. The value of the prepayment option at time 0 is given by the
difference in the zero-profit rate between the two contracts, rˆp0(Y
⋆
0 )− rˆ
np
0 (Y
⋆
0 ).
Figure 8 displays the model-implied time-series for the prepayment option value, rˆp0(Y
⋆
t ) −
rˆnp0 (Y
⋆
t ), alongside the real interest rate and expected inflation. The option value tends to increase
with the real interest rate and expected inflation. When the real interest rate and expected inflation
rate are high, they are likely to revert back to their long-term mean, which increases the likelihood
that the option will be in-the-money in the future. To compensate for this prepayment risk, the
lender sets a higher contract rate on the FRM with prepayment. In our model, the option value is
also affected by time variation in the volatility and the prices of risk.
[Figure 8 about here.]
5.3 The ARM Share and the Prepayment Option
In addition to this option value, we also determine the expected real payments stream that the
borrower makes on each of the contracts, i.e.
∑T
t=1E0
[
qht
]
for h ∈ {p, np}. The latter computation
uses the zero-profit rates and employs a forward simulation technique for the state variables.24
Appendix A contains the details. We then regress the sum of expected real payments on a ten-
year FRM with and without prepayment on the model-implied ten-year real rate risk premium
φy⋆ and expected inflation premium φx⋆ in equations (41) and (42). What is key to our mortgage
choice analysis is that the expected payments on both contracts increase with both risk premia.
Consistent with Figure 7, we find that the sensitivity of the expected payments on an FRM with
prepayment option is smaller than the sensitivity for an FRM option without prepayment. The
24This computation takes into account all effects of inflation on intermediate and terminal payments. We do not
make any of the approximations of Section 2.2 in computing the real payment streams.
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expected payment differential in (43) relates negatively to the risk premia.
10∑
s=1
Et [q
p
t+s] = 1.15 + 4.80× φ
y⋆
t + 2.33× φ
x⋆
t + εt, (41)
10∑
s=1
Et [q
np
t+s] = 1.13 + 5.74× φ
y⋆
t + 2.97× φ
x⋆
t + εt, (42)
10∑
s=1
Et [q
p
t+s]−
10∑
s=1
Et [q
np
t+s] = 0.02− 0.94× φ
y⋆
t − 0.65× φ
x⋆
t + εt. (43)
Finally, we revisit the ARM share regressions and ask whether the option value contains any
additional information. Univariately, we find a positive and significant relationship between the
ARM share and the option value. This positive sign survives in the multi-variate regressions in
columns (4) and (8) of Table 2. Using the same term structure variables as in columns (2) and
(6), we add the orthogonal component of the option value as a fifth regressor. One explanation
for the lower preference for an FRM when the prepayment option is expensive (after controlling
for risk) is that an expensive prepayment option front-loads the FRM’s payment schedule. The
option is paid up-front, but the benefits of lower payments arising from exercising the option arise
only in the future. This ‘tilt’ effect is also described in Campbell (2006), and may explain why a
borrowing-constrained investor may prefer the ARM in the presence of the option.25
6 Analysis for the United Kingdom
As a robustness check, we repeat the full analysis for the UK. This is important for at least three
reasons. First, to show that the same yield curve variables also explain a substantial fraction of
the ARM share in a different country is an important robustness check. Second, to the extent that
bond risk premia look different in the UK than in the US and to the extent that these differences
are related to variation in the ARM share, the term structure determination theory of mortgage
choice gains further credibility. Moreover, our findings may even suggest why the mortgage markets
in the UK are so different from those in the US. Third, we have a longer, and potentially better
time-series of real bond yields available in the UK than in the US.
25That same relationship between the ARM share and the option value holds when we use the ten-year risk premia
that are generated inside the three-dimensional VAR. These risk premia are computed inside the model, based on
the dynamics of Y ⋆ and the market prices of risk. They do not use real yield data, unlike the risk premia used in
Section 4. All signs are the same, and the regression R2 using these model-generated premia is 41.8%.
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6.1 VAR Results
We repeat the analysis we did for the US. That is, we estimate a monthly VAR with 12-month
lagged bond yields of one-, five-, and ten-year maturity and realized inflation on the right-hand side.
The nominal yields are from the Bank of England, the inflation rate is the 12-month log difference
in Retail Price Index (RPI), the counterpart to the American CPI. As for the US, we estimate
the VAR on the period 1985.1-2006.6. After we form long-term expected inflation and long-term
expected real rates, we construct the inflation risk premium and real rate risk premium using real
yield data on five- or ten-year bonds. The UK has much longer time-series for inflation-linked bond
yields; the Bank of England data start in 1985.1.
[Figure 9 about here.]
There are substantial differences between the evolution of the term structure in the US and in
the UK. Figures 9 and 10 are the UK counterparts to Figures 3 and 4. Figure 9 shows that long-
term expected inflation and real rate trend downwards over the sample, aside from an increase in
the late 1980s. The decline in expected inflation after 1991 tracks the decline in realized inflation;
likewise, realized inflation was high in the late 1980s. Inflation expectations stabilize around 2%
per year at the end of the sample, lower than in the US. As a result of the bigger nominal-real
yield spread and the lower inflation expectations, the inflation risk premium is much larger in
the UK. Figure 10 shows that it is mostly positive, and it goes down from 3% to 1% per year.
Conversely, the real rate premium is negative in the UK; it was positive in the US. After being
very negative around 1990, it stabilizes between -1% and 0% after 1995. Just as in the US, the two
risk premia are strongly negatively correlated (-76% at the five- and -63% at the ten-year horizon).
The bottom two rows zoom in on the 1997.7-2006.6 subsample, the same sample we had in Figure
4 for the US. In the UK, the two risk premia drift away from each other after 2002, whereas in
the US, they both seem to converge to zero. Finally, the top right panel of Figure 9 shows that
the conditional volatilities of the real rate and expected inflation co-move positively in the UK,
whereas they co-move negatively in the US. In short, the term structure determinants of mortgage
choice look dramatically different in the UK than in the US.
[Figure 10 about here.]
6.2 ARM Share Regression Results
The mortgage market in the UK has some important differences with the US. First, long-term
fixed-rate mortgages are a lot less prevalent than in the US. The most prevalent contract is a
standard variable rate contract, for which the interest rate is adjusted several times per year.
Most fixed-rate contracts have one-to-three-year fixed interest rate periods. Ten-year fixed-rate
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contracts are relatively new.26 Second, fixed-rate mortgages have no prepayment option. We have
data on the mortgage composition in the UK from the Council of Mortgage Lenders starting in
1993.27 Despite these differences, Figure 11 shows that there is a lot of variation in mortgage
composition in the UK as well. The ARM share varies between 85% and 25%. The overall fraction
of adjustable rate contracts is higher than in the US. The ARM share decreases near the end of
the sample because of the increased availability and popularity of longer-term fixed-rate contracts.
[Figure 11 about here.]
We repeat the regressions of the ARM share on the one-month lagged term structure variables
in Table 4. The left columns report the results for the 1993.1-2006.6 sample, using a monthly ARM
series based on the quarterly ARM share data, whereas the right columns report the results for
the sample 2002.1-2006.6, for which we have actual monthly ARM shares. In sharp contrast to the
analysis for the US, it is the real rate risk premium that is the key driver of mortgage choice in the
UK. In both columns (1) and (5), the ten-year real rate risk premium is significant. The expected
inflation risk premium has the right sign, but is insignificant. The R2 increases only marginally
compared to the univariate regression of the ARM share on the real rate premium. It is 61.9% for
the 2002-2006 sample and 22.6% for the 1993-2006 sample. The effects are economically large. A
0.35 percentage point, or two-standard deviation, increase in the ten-year real rate risk premium
in the 2002-2006 sample increases the ARM share by 16 percentage points, from 52% to 68%. The
R2 is on the same order of magnitude as the one we found for the US in the later sample, but
this time the real rate premium is the key variable instead of the inflation risk premium. Adding
the variance terms in column (2) and (6) improves the explanatory power, especially in the later
sample. The R2 increases to 77%, all four variables have the right sign, and all are significant.
Finally, adding orthogonal information in the yield spread does not improve the R2 in the full
sample, but it does in the later sample. The R2 improves by another 1.6% in column (7). We do
not consider the option value effects because there is no prepayment option in the UK.
[Table 4 about here.]
26The Miles report (2004) contains a detailed overview of the UK mortgage market, and its recommendation is
to deepen the long-term fixed-rate mortgage market. Coles and Hardt (2000) discuss differences between US and
European mortgage markets.
27The data are monthly from 2002.1 onwards, and quarterly from 1993.1 onwards. The quarterly data are averages
of the three months of the quarter. We use a Kalman filtering procedure, suggested by Hansen and Sargent (2004),
to undo the temporal aggregation, and to obtain a monthly time-series that starts in 1993.1. Appendix B contains
the details.
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7 Discussion
The above results suggest that households seem capable of timing their mortgage choice. They take
out ARMs when the FRM contracts are expensive because the expected inflation risk premium
or the real rate risk premium is high, or because expected inflation is more volatile compared to
the real rate. Arguably, mortgage origination is one of the most important financial decisions a
household makes. Since mortgage origination is a rare event which requires an active decision,
households seem more likely to devote time and effort to evaluate their choices. In contrast,
prepayment decisions may be more prone to inertia.28 Most importantly, many households seek
advice from professionals or mortgage lenders on mortgage choice. The argument below suggests
that there may be reasons why mortgage suppliers may have incentives to recommend the “right”
mortgage type at the right time.
Consider a mortgage supplier that has a pool of mortgages outstanding. This pool is comprised
of both ARM and FRM contracts. The FRM contracts can be prepaid at each point in time
without any costs, and prepayment decisions are made optimally. The mortgage supplier borrows
all money via the treasury market to extend the mortgage contracts. We further assume that the
ARM contracts are truly single-period contracts so that borrowing cash perfectly hedges the ARM
mortgage pool. The FRM position, on the contrary, is hedged by borrowing long-term bonds with
maturity N . To have the same interest rate risk as the mortgage pool, the mortgage supplier
borrows an amount Bt so that Bt × N = DURt × FRMt × Ct, where Ct denotes the total value
of the mortgage pool at time t, FRMt the fraction of FRM contracts, and DURt the effective
duration of the mortgage pool at time t (Appendix C contains a formal definition of this duration).
This guarantees that the outstanding positions in treasury bonds and fixed-rate mortgages have
the same interest rate risk.29
When bond risk premia increase, holding constant expectations of future short rates, the pre-
payment probability decreases. For example, expected inflation risk premia are high when expected
inflation is high. Investors demand high long-term nominal bond rates to compensate for the in-
flation risk. With high long-term nominal interest rates come high FRM rates, and this makes
prepayment less attractive. Since prepayment becomes less likely, the effective duration of the
existing FRM pool increases, and exceeds that of the hedge portfolio. One way to restore the bal-
28A large literature documents suboptimally slow prepayment decisions by households, see for instance Schwartz
and Torous (1989), Stanton (1995), and Boudoukh, Whitelaw, Richardson, and Stanton (1997).
29A large fraction of FRM debt, in the conforming loan market, is purchased by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, who
exchange the mortgages for mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Many depository institutions do not resell all MBS
to the secondary markets, and end up holding a substantial fraction on their balance sheet. The Aggregated Thrift
Financial Report, available from the FDIC, suggests that the US financial sector had direct mortgage holdings of $1
trillion and MBS holdings of $175 billion in June 2006. In addition, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae held a combined
total of $1.4 trillion of mortgage-backed securities on their own books at the end of 2005. Some doubt whether the
associated interest rate risk is appropriately hedged (Jaffee (2006)).
29
ance is to adjust the hedging portfolio Bt. Alternatively, the mortgage supplier can try to decrease
FRMt. In other words, the mortgage supplier has the incentive to recommend ARM contracts
to new customers. This illustrates that the mortgage lenders may have incentives to recommend
ARMs when bond risk premia are high, which is the fact we documented in the data.
8 Conclusion
We have shown that the time variation in the risk premium on a long-term nominal bond can
explain a large fraction of the variation in the share of newly-originated mortgages that are of the
adjustable-rate type. Thinking of fixed-rate mortgages as a short position in long-term bonds and
adjustable-rate mortgages as rolling over a short position in short-term bonds implies that fixed-
rate mortgage holders are paying a nominal bond risk premium, which consists of an expected
inflation premium and a real rate premium. In the US, fixed-rate mortgages tend to have long
maturities and are therefore very sensitive to inflation risk. We have shown that the inflation risk
premium alone can explain more than sixty percent in the variation of the mortgage composition.
These results are not sensitive to how expected inflation is measured: we studied both a direct
measure from the survey of professional forecasters, and an indirect measure from a VAR model.
Other, perhaps more straightforward, term structure variables such as the slope of the yield curve,
have much lower explanatory power for the ARM share.
As a robustness check we also study the UK. We use the same VAR model to uncover the term
structure variables of interest and find them to be quite different from those in the US. However,
the term structure variables are still linked to mortgage choice. In the UK, where FRMs are a
lot less prevalent and of much shorter maturity, it is the real rate risk premium that drives the
variation in mortgage choice rather than variation in the expected inflation risk premium. This
makes sense given that inflation risk is most potent at longer maturities, and the UK simply does
not have such long-term mortgage contracts.
In the US, FRMs come with an option to refinance, the prepayment option. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to value the prepayment option in a VAR model with time-varying
expected inflation and real rate risk premia, and time-varying expected inflation and real rate
volatility. We show that the FRM with prepayment option continues to have positive exposure to
real interest and expected inflation risk, and therefore that higher bond risk premia make it a less
attractive compared to the ARM. We find a positive relation between the option value and the
ARM share. Expensive prepayment options makes mortgage payments front-loaded, which may
make the ARM the more desirable choice for a borrowing-constrained investor.
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A The Prepayment Option in the VAR Model
A.1 Estimation of the Prepayment Model
In this appendix, we provide the details on the estimation of the three-dimensional VAR(1)-model
in Section 5. The VAR(1)-model in (35) is estimated via OLS per equation, resulting in the
following estimates
µˆ⋆ =


−0.0283
0.0154
0.0000

 , Γˆ⋆ =


0.4935 1.8455 −0.5583
0.0912 0.5074 −0.1049
0.0000 1.0000 0.0000

 .
Notice that the last element of µˆ⋆ is zero and that the last row of Γˆ⋆ equals the second unit vector.
This reflects the fact that conditional expectation of the third state variable, realized inflation,
equals the second state variable, expected inflation.
Using the residuals ηˆ⋆t , the parameters α
⋆
i and β
⋆
i , for i = 1, 2, 3 can be estimated consistently
via non-linear least squares,
(αˆ⋆i , βˆ
⋆
i ) = arg min
(α⋆,β⋆)
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
ηˆ⋆2t×12+12(i) − exp(α
⋆ + β⋆Y ⋆t×12(i))
)2
,
and the elements of the correlation matrix Ωˆ⋆ can be estimated using the standardized residuals:
diag
(√
exp(αˆ1
⋆ + βˆ1
⋆
Y ⋆
t(1)), . . . ,
√
exp(αˆ3
⋆ + βˆ3
⋆
Y ⋆
t(3))
)−1
ηˆ⋆t+12.
We find the following values
α⋆1 = −8.8682 , β
⋆
1 = −10.3258, (44)
α⋆2 = −13.1828 , β
⋆
2 = 62.8601, (45)
α⋆3 = −9.9898 , β
⋆
3 = 22.9146, (46)
and
Ω⋆ =


1.0000 0.4894 0.3363
0.4894 1.0000 0.8220
0.3363 0.8220 1.0000

 .
The only remaining parameters needed are the market prices of risk λ0 and Λ1 in (37). They are
not pinned down by the VAR. We determine these values by minimizing the squared pricing errors
for the model-implied 5-year and 10-year nominal bond yield over the period 1985:1-2006:6. The
yield of a τ -year bond satifies
y$t (τ) = −
1
τ
log (Pt (τ)) , with
Pt(τ) = Et exp
(
τ∑
s=1
m$t+s
)
.
Specifically, we simulate 100 ten-year antithetic trajectories for the stochastic shocks and minimize
the squared pricing error summed over (i) the 258 months in the sample, (ii) the two maturities
considered, and (iii) the simulated trajectories. To enhance identification, we assume that the price
of realized inflation risk is zero, the price of real interest rate depends on the real interest rate only,
and the price of expected inflation risk depends on the real interest and expected inflation rate.
This specification of the prices of risk is consistent with Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2006). This
leaves us with five parameters to estimate, for which we find the following values
λ0 =


−22.45
57.41
0.00

 , Λ1 =


−607.52 0.00 0.00
775.66 −386.30 0.00
0.000 0.00 0.00

 .
A.2 Solution Method Valuation Prepayment Option
We solve the model with a T = 10 year horizon and a time step size of one year. We choose
a grid for the state variables in Y ⋆t and the contract rate rt. We use backward induction. At
time t, for all values on the grid we solve for the lender’s valuation, V pt (Y
⋆
t , rt) and V
np
t (Y
⋆
t , rt),
and the zero-profit, prepayment rate rˆpt (Y
⋆
t ). At time 0 we also solve for the zero-profit rate on
the FRM without prepayment option rˆnp0 (Y
⋆
0 ). The conditional expectations in (39) and (40)
are approximated using a five-point Gaussian quadrature for the innovations in each of the three
state variables (Tauchen and Hussey (1991)). Evaluating the conditional expectation at time-t
requires knowing the lender’s value at time-(t + 1) in-between the chosen grid points. For this
we use quadratic interpolation techniques. Similar interpolation techniques are used to determine
the zero-profit contract rates, given the lender’s value function. Finally, to determine expected
real payments for the two contracts we simulate the state variables forward and use the derived
prepayment rates to determine the prevailing mortgage rate for the borrower with an FRM with
prepayment option.
B Monthly ARM Share Data in the UK
We observe the ARM share data for the UK only at a quarterly frequency in the 1993-2001
period. Since all models are specified at monthly frequency, we want to estimate the data points
in between. We employ a Kalman filter together with a specification for the ARM dynamics that
is motivated by the US ARM share dynamics. The method is discussed in Hansen and Sargent
(2004), Chapter 9.13. The goal is to improve upon linear interpolation by postulating reasonable
dynamics for the ARM share dynamics. Linear interpolation may be sub-optimal because the
average over month 1 to 3 may have very little to with the average over month 4 to 6. Linearly
interpolation introduces dependencies that are not present in the underlying data. The current
approach explicitly incorporates the aggregation.
B.1 Kalman Filter
Denote the monthly fraction of ARM mortgages at time t by xt. We assume that xt follows an
AR(1) model:
xt+1 = a+ bxt + ǫt+1, ǫt+1 ∼ N(0, σ
2). (47)
The distributional assumption is required to be able to use the Kalman filter. To justify this time
series process, we estimate an AR(1) on the ARM share in the US. The R2 of this AR(1) process
is 93% over the sample 1985:1-2005:12. The autoregressive parameter equals bˆ = 0.96.
For the Kalman filter, we need a state transition equation and an observation equation. Towards
this end, we introduce the state vector yt = (xt, xt−1, xt−2)
′. The state transition equation for the
state vector is given by:
yt =


a
0
0

+


b 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0

 yt−1 +


ǫt
0
0

 (48)
≡ c+Dyt−1 + ut. (49)
Since we observe the average mortgage choice over three months, we lag the system for two addition
periods:
yt = (I +D +D
2)c+D3yt−3 + ut +Dut−1 +D
2ut−2 (50)
≡ e+ Fyt−3 + ξt, (51)
which results in the transition equation at a quarterly frequency. We observe the average mortgage
choice over a quarter, i.e.:
zt = ι
′
3×1yt/3, (52)
which constitutes the observation equation. Finally, we initialize the Kalman filter assuming that
the vector of starting values is drawn from the unconditional distribution.
B.2 Empirical Results
We estimates the coefficients a, b, and σ by maximum likelihood. We find aˆ = 2.9828 (1.7566),
bˆ = 0.9457 (0.0315), and σ = 5.0174 (0.4751), where the numbers in parentheses are standard
errors, computed from the outer product gradient. The solid line in Figure 11 shows the resulting
monthly ARM share for the UK.
To verify that the Kalman filter does work properly, we verify that the average ARM shares
over each three month-period coincides with the quarterly data. We also compare the monthly
ARM share that arises from the Kalman filter to the one that arises from a Kalman smoother, and
find them to be very similar. Finally, we verify that the monthly data obtained from the Kalman
filter are close to the actual monthly data over the 2002.1-2006.6 period, for which we have the
monthly data. The red circles in Figure 11 correspond to the actual monthly data; the solid line
cuts through these data points.
C Details on the Supply-Side Argument
The FRM pool at time t is characterized by the effective duration, which is defined as:
DURt =
∑Jt
j=1
∑njt
n=1 p
j
t(n)c
j
tn∑Jt
j=1
∑njt
n=1 p
j
t(n)c
j
t
, (53)
where j = 1, . . . , Jt indicates the individual FRM contracts in the pool, n
j
t the remaining number
of payments to be made by the FRM borrower j, and pjt(n) the prepayment probability probability
at time t that household j will prepay n periods from now given a current contract rate cjt . This
definition of the effective duration assumes that the contract is terminated in case of prepayment.
If the household chooses to refinance with the same mortgage provider, it is considered a new
borrower with a new contract rate and new prepayment probabilities. Likewise, the mortgage
supplier only hedges the outstanding contracts.
Table 1: Univariate Regression Analysis of the ARM Share for the US.
This table reports slope coefficients, Newey-West t-statistics (12 lags), and R2 statistics for univariate regressions of the ARM share on
a constant and one regressor, reported in the first column. The regressors are the following variables. The τ -year inflation risk premium
φxt (τ), the τ -year real rate risk premium φ
y
t (τ), the conditional variance of expected inflation V
x
t , and the conditional variance in the
real rate V yt . The τ -year nominal bond risk premium φ
$
t (τ) is the sum of the τ -year real interest rate and τ -year expected inflation
premium. The τ -year nominal yield is given by y$t (τ). The τ -one-year yield spread is y
$
t (τ)− y
$
t (1). y
$
t (FRM)− y
$
t (ARM) denotes the
difference between the FRM rate y$t (FRM), and the ARM rate y
$
t (ARM). The regressor is lagged by one period, relative to the ARM
share. The left panel is for the longest sample from 1985.1-2006.6; the right panel is for the sample over which we have data for both
the 5-year and the 10-year treasury inflation-protected security: 1997.7-2006.6. All variables have been multiplied by 100.
1985.1-2006.6 1997.7-2006.6
Sample slope t-stat R2 slope t-stat R2
φxt (5) 16.77 5.91 44.12 12.76 8.49 63.52
φ
y
t (5) 3.68 0.87 2.19 −8.88 −3.53 28.51
φxt (10) 17.19 4.91 44.59 14.46 6.77 56.24
φ
y
t (10) 6.88 2.20 12.21 −8.59 −3.01 25.49
V xt 169.20 2.87 25.67 −17.19 −0.25 0.18
V
y
t −28.91 −2.92 22.84 3.31 0.34 0.76
φ$t (5) ≡ φ
y
t (5) + φ
x
t (5) 9.99 4.16 32.21 6.47 1.63 11.45
φ$t (10) ≡ φ
y
t (10) + φ
x
t (10) 8.04 3.91 35.13 3.62 0.76 3.33
y$t (5)− y
$
t (1) 0.60 0.21 0.11 0.80 0.35 0.64
y$t (10)− y
$
t (1) −0.59 −0.32 0.23 0.34 0.22 0.27
y$t (FRM)− y
$
t (ARM) 16.03 3.17 35.31 0.36 0.05 0.01
y$t (FRM)− y
$
t (ARM) orth. 18.25 3.85 41.23 0.21 0.03 0.00
y$t (1) 3.47 3.27 28.73 −0.41 −0.34 0.73
y$t (5) 4.46 3.76 37.76 −0.58 −0.29 0.57
y$t (10) 4.98 3.85 39.26 −1.27 −0.41 1.25
y$t (ARM) 4.08 3.28 22.33 −3.45 −1.03 7.73
y$t (FRM) 4.28 3.71 32.87 −2.47 −0.82 5.45
Table 2: Multivariate Regression Analysis for ARM Share in US.
This table reports slope coefficients, Newey-West t-statistics, and R2 statistics for multivariate regressions of the ARM share on a
constant and the variables listed in the first column. The regressors are lagged by one period, relative to the ARM share. The right-
hand side variables are demeaned so that the constant gives the average ARM share in the sample. The regressors are the ten-year
inflation risk premium φxt (10), the ten-year real rate risk premium φ
y
t (10), the conditional variance of expected inflation V
x
t , and the
conditional variance in the real rate V yt . The ten-one-year yield spread y
$
t (10) − y
$
t (1) and the prepayment option value rˆ
p
t − rˆ
np
t are
orthogonalized to the other four term structure variables. We run an auxiliary regression of these variables on the first four variables
and include the regression residual as a fifth explanatory variable. The left panel is for the longest sample from 1985.1-2006.5; the right
panel is for the sample over which we have reliable real yield data: 1997.7-2006.6. Newey-West t-statistics (12 lags) are in parentheses.
1985.1-2006.6 1997.7-2006.6
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant 28.66 28.66 28.66 28.66 21.61 21.61 21.61 21.61
(14.72) (16.39) (16.53) (17.09) (14.24) (16.10) (16.08) (16.50)
φxt (10) 15.97 14.27 14.27 14.27 13.38 15.13 15.13 15.13
(4.81) (5.15) (5.14) (5.14) (5.86) (5.09) (5.10) (5.29)
φ
y
t (10) 2.72 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -1.62 -1.32 -1.32 -1.32
(1.15) (-0.36) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.53) (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.53)
V xt 43.89 43.89 43.89 32.50 32.50 32.50
(0.73) (0.76) (0.76) (0.62) (0.63) (0.65)
V
y
t -15.11 -15.11 -15.11 -6.19 -6.19 -6.19
(-2.08) (-2.03) (-2.03) (-0.89) (-0.90) (-0.84)
y$t (10)− y
$
t (1) 3.89 -0.43
(0.65) (-0.08)
rˆ
p
t − rˆ
np
t 19.45 28.54
(1.36) (0.98)
R2 46.27 53.93 54.30 55.92 56.82 60.98 60.99 62.24
Table 3: Alternative ARM Share Measures in US.
This table reports slope coefficients, Newey-West t-statistics (12 lags) in parentheses, and R2 statistics for multivariate regressions of the
ARM share on a constant and the variables listed in the first column. The right-hand side variables are demeaned so that the constant
gives the average ARM share in the sample. The regressors are the ten-year inflation risk premium φxt (10), the ten-year real rate risk
premium φyt (10), the conditional variance of expected inflation V
x
t , and the conditional variance in the real rate V
y
t . The first column
is our benchmark measure; the other three ARM share measures are defined in Section 4.1. The regressors are lagged by one period,
relative to the ARM share. The sample is 1997.7-2006.6.
RHS variables ARM1 ARM2 ARM3 ARM4
constant 21.61 18.10 10.92 21.54
(16.10) (16.25) (15.95) (15.76)
φxt (10) 15.13 12.88 6.18 14.98
(5.09) (5.27) (4.50) (5.12)
φ
y
t (10) -1.32 -0.39 0.91 -2.93
(-0.46) (-0.16) (0.59) (-0.97)
V xt 32.50 23.45 5.72 36.86
(0.62) (0.56) (0.23) (0.61)
V
y
t -6.19 -3.55 -5.40 -4.91
(-0.89) (-0.64) (-2.02) (-0.62)
R2 60.98 60.51 41.59 63.98
Table 4: Multivariate Regression Analysis for ARM Share in UK.
This table reports slope coefficients, Newey-West t-statistics, and R2 statistics for multivariate regressions of the ARM share on a
constant and the variables listed in the first column. The regressors are lagged by one period, relative to the ARM share, and are
demeaned. The regressors are the ten-year inflation risk premium φxt (10), the ten-year real rate risk premium φ
y
t (10), the conditional
variance of expected inflation V xt , and the conditional variance in the real rate V
y
t . We also consider the ten-year minus one-year yield
spread, orthogonalized to the other four term structure variables. The left panel is for the longest sample from 1993.1-2006.6. It uses
the monthly ARM share obtained through the Kalman filter, see Appendix B. The right panel is for the sample over which we have
monthly data for the ARM share: 2002.1-2006.6. Newey-West t-statistics (12 lags) are in parentheses.
1993.1-2006.6 2002.1-2006.6
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7)
constant 57.53 57.53 57.53 52.48 52.48 52.48
(20.13) (20.35) (20.21) (20.77) (51.56) (55.92)
φxt (10) 2.05 0.64 -0.77 12.81 59.96 67.40
(0.40) (0.10) (-0.10) (1.21) (4.39) (4.63)
φ
y
t (10) 22.40 20.59 17.15 45.62 98.07 87.50
(2.48) (2.07) (1.29) (5.40) (11.01) (8.48)
V xt 0.79 -16.23 595.96 506.82
(0.02) (-0.31) (7.50) (6.56)
V
y
t 15.36 41.69 -74.72 91.58
(0.69) (0.87) (-2.37) (1.61)
y$t (10)− y
$
t (1) 21.02 86.65
(0.58) (4.27)
R2 22.55 23.90 24.48 61.86 76.87 78.59
Figure 1: The Share of Adjustable Rate Mortgages in the US.
The figure plots the fraction of all newly originated mortgages that are of the adjustable-rate type. The complementary fraction are
fixed-rate mortgages. The data are from the Federal Housing Financing Board and are based on the Monthly Interest Rate Survey sent
out to mortgage lenders. It covers all property types: newly constructed homes, and existing homes. ARMs include hybrid mortgages,
which may have an initial fixed-interest rate payment period of up to ten years.
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Figure 2: The Inflation Risk Premium and the ARM Share in the US.
The figure plots the fraction of all mortgages that are of the adjustable-rate type against the left axis, and the inflation risk premium
against the right axis. The inflation risk premium is computed as the difference between the 5-year nominal bond yield, the 5-year real
bond yield and the expected inflation. The nominal and real 5-year bond yields are from McCulloch and start in January 1997. The
inflation expectation is the median long-term (10-year) inflation forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
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Figure 3: VAR Estimation for the US.
The figure plots long-term risk premia. The 5-year risk premia for expected inflation risk and for real rate risk are plotted in the left
panel. The 10-year risk premia, formed by subtracting the 10-year real rate yield data from the VAR-implied 10-year real rate.
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Figure 4: Inflation and Real Rate Risk Premia in the US.
The figure plots long-term risk premia. The five-year risk premia for expected inflation risk and for real rate risk are plotted in the left
panel. The ten-year risk premia, formed by subtracting the ten-year real rate yield data from the VAR-implied five-year real rate.
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Figure 5: Backfilling Inflation and Real Rate Risk Premia for the US.
The figure plots ten-year risk premia. The solid black line is the ten-year nominal risk premium. It is computed as the difference
between the observed nominal ten-year yield {y$t (120)} and the average expected nominal ten-year yield. These expectations are readily
obtained from the VAR for the entire 1985.1-2006.6 period. The circled purple line is the projected ten-year real rate risk premium,
φ
y
t (10), formed as the product of the state variables z and the regression coefficients in equation (34). These loadings are estimated on
the 1997.7-2006.6 sub-sample. The circled turquoise line is the expected inflation risk premium, φxt (10). It is formed as the difference
between the nominal risk premium and the inflation risk premium according to equation (17). For the 1997.7-2006.6 sample, we overlay
the actual risk premia (reported earlier in Figure 4) on the projected risk premia.
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Figure 6: The ARM Share for the US in More Detail.
The figure plots the fraction of all newly originated mortgages that are of the adjustable-rate type between 1992.1 and 2006.6. The first
three series are from the Federal Housing Financing Board and are based on the Monthly Interest Rate Survey sent out to mortgage
lenders. The first series includes all hybrid mortgages. The second series excludes hybrids with an initial fixed-rate period of more than
five years, and the third series excludes hybrids with an initial fixed-rate period of more than three years. The last series is from Freddie
Mac and is based on the Primary Mortgage Market Survey. Like the first measure, it contains all ARM originations.
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Figure 7: Price Sensitivity to Changes in the Real Rate and Expected Inflation for the US.
The figure plots the price sensitivities of the FRM contract with and without prepayment to the real interest rate y (top panel) and
expected inflation x (bottom panel). The mortgage values are determined within the model of Section 5.2. The analogous fixed-income
securities are a regular bond (FRM without prepayment) and a callable bond (FRM with prepayment).
−0.02 −0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
Real interest rate
Pr
ice
Price callable bond / Value FRM with prepayment
Price regular bond / Value FRM without prepayment
−0.02 −0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
Expected inflation rate
Pr
ice
Price callable bond / Value FRM with prepayment
Price regular bond / Value FRM without prepayment
Figure 8: Value of the Prepayment Option for the US.
The figure plots the value of the prepayment option along with the real interest rate and expected inflation between 1985.1 and 2006.6.
The prepayment option is defined as the mortgage rate differential between an FRM with and without prepayment. The mortgage rates
are determined within the model of Section 5.
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Figure 9: VAR Estimation for the UK.
The figure plots long-term risk premia. The 5-year risk premia for expected inflation risk and for real rate risk are plotted in the left
panel. The 10-year risk premia, formed by subtracting the 10-year real rate yield data from the VAR-implied 10-year real rate.
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Figure 10: Inflation and Real Rate Risk Premia in the UK.
The figure plots long-term risk premia. The 5-year risk premia for expected inflation risk and for real rate risk are plotted in the left
panel. The 10-year risk premia, formed by subtracting the 10-year real rate yield data from the VAR-implied 10-year real rate.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Five−Year Risk Premia
 
 
Exp. Inflation
Real Rate
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Ten−Year Risk Premia
 
 
Exp. Inflation
Real Rate
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
5−Year Risk Premia from 1997.7
 
 
Exp. Inflation
Real Rate
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
10−Year Risk Premia from 1997.7
 
 
Exp. Inflation
Real Rate
Figure 11: The Share of Adjustable Rate Mortgages in the UK.
The figure plots the fraction of all newly originated mortgages that are of the adjustable-rate type. The complementary fraction are
fixed-rate mortgages. The data are from the Council of Mortgage Lenders (sheet ML5) and are based on the Survey of Mortgage
Lenders before April 2005 and based on Product Sales Data reported to the CML after April 2005. It covers both house purchases and
remortgages. Adjustable rate mortgages are the sum of standard variable rate contracts (SVR), discounted (variable rate) mortgages
and trackers. Fixed rate mortgages are the sum of fixed contracts and capped contracts. The red-circled line plots the monthly data,
which are only available from January 2002 onwards. The solid blue line is a monthly time-series, which we generate from quarterly
temporally aggregated data that start in 1993.I. See Appendix B for details on this procedure.
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